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I.

INTRODUCTION

A common event in the life of a purchase-money security interest in
consumer goods1 is the agreement between the secured party and debtor to
refinance2 or renew3 the debt when the debtor is unable to pay completely on the
date the debt is due. The refinancing or renewal of the debt raises the issue of
whether the security interest remains a purchase-money security interest, because a
purchase-money security interest exists when the collateral secures only the debt
incurred to obtain the collateral, not other debts.4 If the purchase-money debt is
renewed or refinanced, the resulting indebtedness is no longer a debt the debtor
* Professor of Law, University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
1

A purchase-money security interest in consumer goods exists when the debtor finances its purchase
of consumer goods using credit from the seller or a loan from a lender and grants the seller or lender
a security interest in the goods purchased to secure the amount financed. U.C.C. § 9-103(a), (b)(1)
(2005). Consumer goods means "goods that are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family,
or household purposes.” § 9-102(a)(23). Unless otherwise noted, all U.C.C. citations following are to
the 2005 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code.
2

U.C.C. § 9-103(f)(3) lists, but does not define, “refinanced.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines
refinancing as: “An exchange of an old debt for a new debt, as by negotiating a different interest rate
or term or by repaying the existing loan with money acquired from a new loan.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1285 (7th ed. 1999). The parties to a secured transaction might use the term
“refinancing” regardless of whether the transaction has those incidents or is merely a renewal of an
existing debt.
3

U.C.C. § 9-103(f)(3) also lists “renewed” and also leaves it undefined. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines renewal as: “The re-creation of a legal relationship or the replacement of an old contract with
a new contract, as opposed to the mere extension of a previous relationship or contract.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (7th ed. 1999). Unless the context indicates otherwise, I will use “renewal”
and “refinancing” interchangeably because I contend that the legal effect of either should be the same.
4

U.C.C. § 9-103(a), (b).
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incurred to obtain the collateral—the debtor had the collateral before the refinancing
or renewal. Consequently, the purchase-money collateral does not secure a
purchase-money obligation, and the security interest is “transformed” from a
purchase-money security interest to a nonpurchase-money security interest.5
Frequently, the debtor borrows additional funds when refinancing or
renewing the purchase-money obligation—a future advance under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.6 Adding a future advance to the refinancing transaction
creates an additional basis for asserting that the security interest is no longer
purchase-money. In that instance, the future advance does not enable the debtor to
obtain the purchase-money collateral; thus, part of the obligation is not purchasemoney.
The classification of the security interest as purchase-money or nonpurchasemoney is important for several reasons. First, a purchase-money security interest in
consumer goods is perfected automatically under section 9-309(1) when it attaches;
filing a financing statement is not necessary.7 A security interest so perfected
becomes unperfected if it is transformed from purchase-money to nonpurchasemoney and the secured party has not perfected by another method.8 The
consequences of having an unperfected security interest can be disastrous if another
creditor has a perfected security interest in the same collateral or if the debtor files
5

Courts and commentators have labeled this shift from a purchase-money security interest to a
nonpurchase-money security interest the “transformation rule”: the security interest is transformed
from purchase-money to nonpurchase-money. See, e.g., In re Freeman, 956 F.2d 252, 254 (11th Cir.
1992); In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 7a.
6

“A security agreement may provide that collateral secures . . . future advances or other value,
whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment.” U.C.C. § 9-204(c).
Although Article 9 does not define future advance, a future advance occurs when a secured party
extends additional credit to the debtor after giving the initial value required for attachment of the
security interest under U.C.C. § 9-203(b). A secured party can make a future advance regardless of
whether the debt is being refinanced or renewed.
7

U.C.C. § 9-309(1). Perfection of most security interests requires an additional act beyond
attachment. § 9-308(a). Section 9-309(1)’s perfection upon attachment generally does not operate for
goods subject to a federal or state statute or treaty that adopts a perfection requirement for collateral.
The most common example is a state statute for certificate of title goods that requires perfection of a
security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title by indication of the security interest on a
certificate of title. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186A.190 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
8

U.C.C. § 9-308(b).
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for bankruptcy. A perfected security interest always has priority over an unperfected
security interest.9 In bankruptcy, the trustee in bankruptcy can avoid an unperfected
security interest.10 Second, perfected purchase-money security interests have priority
over conflicting perfected nonpurchase-money security interests in the same
collateral.11 Transformation from purchase-money to nonpurchase-money can result
in loss of priority under the first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule of section 9-322(a)
because the security interest that conflicts with the purchase-money security interest
likely has an earlier filing date.12 Third, a debtor in bankruptcy can avoid a
nonpurchase-money, nonpossessory security interest in specific consumer goods.13
Avoidance of the security interest means the creditor no longer has an interest in
collateral that secures the debt owed by the debtor. The creditor has a claim in
bankruptcy against the debtor, but not a secured claim.14
Finally, the Federal Trade Commission Consumer Lending Regulations make
it an unfair trade practice for a lender or a retail installment seller to take from a
consumer a nonpurchase-money, nonpossessory security interest in household
goods.15 Transformation might result in an unfair practice under the regulations.16

9

Id. § 9-322(a)(2).

10

11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2010) (effective June 19, 1998).

11

U.C.C. § 9-324(a). Section 9-324(a) supersedes the general first-to-file-or-perfect rule of priority of
section 9-322(a).

12

“Conflicting perfected security interests . . . rank according to priority in time of filing or
perfection.” Id § 9-322(a)(1).

13

11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(B) (2010). This avoidance power, limited to nonpossessory and nonpurchasemoney security interests, extends to household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,
appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, jewelry held primarily for the personal, family,
or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, implements, professional books, or
tools of the trade of the debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor, and professionally
prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor. Id.
14

§ 101(5); see also § 506(a).

15

16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (2010). 16 C.F.R. § 444.1(i) defines household goods.

16

See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a) (2010).
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A rebuttal to transformation is that it promotes form over substance.17 It is a
reasonable proposition that the obligation created in the refinancing transaction
replaces the original purchase-money loan; thus, the refinanced obligation is not
incurred to obtain the purchase-money collateral. In reality, however, the obligation
is the same as it was, albeit in a different promissory note or loan agreement. It still
represents a debt incurred to purchase the collateral and should be considered a
purchase-money obligation.18
Rebuttal to transformation is also appropriate when a purchase-money
secured party makes a future advance. After a future advance, the secured obligation
consists of two parts: a purchase-money part—the debt incurred to purchase the
collateral—and a nonpurchase-money part—the future advance.19 Likewise, the
security interest consists of two parts: a purchase-money part and a nonpurchasemoney part.20 This is a “dual status” security interest—the security interest has a
status of purchase-money and a status of nonpurchase-money.21
Prior to the enactment of Revised Article 9, many courts found statutory
authority for dual status in section 9-107 of former Article 9.22 Section 9-107
adopted a definition of a purchase-money security interest that operated “to the
extent that” the security interest satisfied the value and collateral requirements of the

17

See In re Geist, 79 B.R. 939, 942 (D. Wyo. 1987); In re Conn 16 B.R. 454, 459 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1982); David Gray Carlson, Purchase Money Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 IDAHO L. REV. 793,
851 (1992).
18

See U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2).

19

§ 9-204(c).

20

See § 9-103 cmt. 7a.

21

Id.

22

See In re Billings, 838 F.2d 405, 408 (10th Cir. 1988); Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc., 742 F.2d
797, 801 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Geist, 79 B.R. 939, 943 (D. Wyo. 1987); In re McAllister, 267 B.R. 614,
620 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001); In re Short, 170 B.R. 128, 134 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994); In re Russell, 29
B.R. 270, 273 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); In re Conn, 16 B.R. 454, 457 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re
Gibson, 16 B.R. 257, 267 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). Yet, not all courts agreed. See, e.g., In re Freeman,
956 F.2d 252 (11th Cir. 1992); In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 1984).
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section.23 These courts believed that “to the extent” authorized a security interest
that is part purchase-money and part nonpurchase-money.24
A shortcoming of the dual status rule was that it did not solve the problem of
how to ascertain what part of the total indebtedness is purchase-money and what
part is not purchase-money after the debtor makes a payment on the obligation. In
other words, how is a payment allocated between the purchase-money and
nonpurchase-money parts of the obligation? Some courts were unwilling to make
the allocation.
Consequently, unless the parties’ agreement or other law
implemented an allocation method, these courts would declare the entire security
interest a nonpurchase-money security interest regardless of whether they accepted
the dual status rule. 25
The opportunity for the drafters of Article 9 to resolve the issue came with
the drafting of Revised Article 9.26 The drafters chose the dual status rule:
[A] purchase-money security interest does not lose its status as such,
even if:

23

Section 9-107. Definitions: “Purchase Money Security Interest”.
A security interest is a ‘purchase money security interest’ to the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such
value is in fact so used.

U.C.C. § 9-107 (1962).
24

See In re Billings, 838 F.2d 405, 408 (10th Cir. 1988); Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc., 742 F.2d
797, 801 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Geist, 79 B.R. 939, 943 (D. Wyo. 1987); In re McAllister, 267 B.R. 614,
620 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001); In re Short, 170 B.R. 128, 134 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994); In re Russell, 29
B.R. 270, 273 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); In re Conn, 16 B.R. 454, 457 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re
Gibson, 16 B.R. 257, 267 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).

25 Southtrust Bank of Ala., Nat’l Ass’n v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240, 1243 (11th
Cir. 1985); Coomer v. Barclays Am. Fin., Inc., 8 B.R. 351, 355 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
26

The Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) Study Group Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 began
studying revision of Article 9 in 1990. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 1 (Dec.
1, 1992) [hereinafter “PEB REPORT”].
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(1) the purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is
not a purchase-money obligation;
(2) collateral that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the
purchase-money obligation; or
(3) the purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced,
consolidation, or restructured. 27
While making dual status definite, the drafters recognized that some courts “have
found [the dual status] rule to be explicit or implicit in the words ‘to the extent.’”28
Additionally, the drafters adopted a method for allocating payments on the debt
made by the debtor.29
Regrettably, the drafters did not resolve these issues as they pertain to
purchase-money security interests in consumer-goods transactions.30 A compromise
among the drafting committee members culminated in limiting the dual status and
payment rules to a purchase-money security interest transaction “other than a
consumer-goods transaction . . . .”31 The drafters clearly intended to let the courts
address whether the dual status rule should apply to consumer purchase-money
security interests:
The limitation of the rules in subsections (e), (f), and (g) to
transactions other than consumer-goods transactions is intended to
leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumergoods transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation the
27

U.C.C. § 9-103(f).

28

§ 9-103 cmt. 7a.

29

§ 9-103(e). The allocation of payment rules are discussed in cmt. 7b.

30

A “consumer-goods transaction” results when an individual “incurs an obligation primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes” and secures the obligation with goods used or bought for
use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. § 9-102(a)(23), (24). Basically, a consumergoods transaction is a security interest in which consumer goods secure a consumer obligation. It
becomes a consumer goods purchase-money security interest transaction when the consumer goods
secure the credit that enabled the individual to obtain the goods or the rights to the goods.
31

§ 9-103(e), (f), (g). Professor Mooney labels it the “consumer compromise.” Charles W. Mooney,
Jr., The Consumer Compromise in Revised U.C.C. Article 9: The Shame of It All, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 215 (2007);
see also Jean Braucher, Deadlock: Consumer Transactions Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 83, 9598 (1999). Part IV discusses the compromise.
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nature of the proper rule in consumer-goods transactions and may
continue to apply established approaches.32
Courts encountering the issue are not without help from Article 9. A court’s
decision must comport with the definition of purchase-money security interest in
section 9-103. Section 9-103 aligns with previous Article 9 texts, defining a
purchase-money security interest using the words “to the extent.”33 “A security
interest in goods is a purchase-money security interest . . . to the extent that the
goods are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest.”34 These
words authorize a security interest that is part purchase-money and part
nonpurchase-money. To the extent that a future advance accompanies a refinancing,
the security interest is part purchase-money and part nonpurchase-money.35 To the
extent that a purchase-money security interest is refinanced with no future advance,
it remains a purchase-money security interest.36 The definition of purchase-money
security interest should persuade a court that dual status is the appropriate rule.37
Parts V and VI of this article present the case for adopting dual status and payment
rules.
Cases discussing “to the extent” under the purchase-money security interest
definition of section 9-107 of former Article 9 are relevant because sections 107 and
103 of Article 9 use similar words to define purchase-money security interest. Part II
summarizes the rationale of these cases. Part III examines the drafting process of
Revised Article 9, which reveals the intent of the drafters regarding the effect of
refinancing. Part IV reviews the “consumer compromise,” which thrusts this issue
to the courts. Finally, Part VII surveys current case law and legislation.
II.

DUAL STATUS UNDER SECTION 9-107 OF FORMER ARTICLE 9

Soon after the states enacted the U.C.C., courts faced the issue of whether a
purchase-money security interest retains its purchase-money status if the security
32

U.C.C. § 9-103(h).

33

See § 9-103.

34

§ 9-103(b)(1).

35

See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text; infra Part V.

36

See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text; infra Part V.

37

I discuss various methods of allocating payments in Part VI.
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agreement includes a future advance clause or the purchase-money obligation is
renewed or refinanced.38 Their decisions fell into one of three categories: allowing
the security interest to have dual status,39 applying transformation from purchasemoney to nonpurchase-money,40 or allowing the decision to rest on whether there is
a method for allocating payments.41 Early comments on this issue by academics
agreed that the language of section 9-107 favored dual status.42
Courts that adopted dual status—a security interest can be part purchasemoney and part nonpurchase-money—typically based their decision on the words of
section 9-107:
A security interest is a “purchase money security interest” to the
extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part
of its purchase price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an
obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the
use of collateral if such value is in fact so used.43
In re Billings, a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, is representative of such
decisions.44
38

E.g., In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 243, 247 (W.D. Mich. 1966). The issue arose more
frequently after October 1, 1979, the effective date of the modern Bankruptcy Code, because the
Bankruptcy Code enabled the debtor, through 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), to avoid a security interest.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title IV, § 402, 92 Stat. 2682.
39

See, e.g., In re Billings, 838 F.2d 405, 410 (10th Cir. 1988).

40

See, e.g., In re Manuel, 507 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 1975).

41

See, e.g., In re Slay, 8 B.R. 355, 358 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).

42

See Mary Aronov, The Transformation Rule Applied to Purchase Money Security Interests in Commercial
Lending Transactions, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 15, 58 (1985); Bernard A. Burk, Preserving the Purchase
Money Status of Refinanced or Commingled Purchase Money Debt, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1143-44 (1983);
Robert M. Lloyd, Refinancing Purchase Money Security Interests, 53 TENN. L. REV. 1, 64 (1985); Gerald T.
McLaughlin, “Add On” Clauses in Equipment Purchase Money Financing: Too Much of a Good Thing, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 682 (1981); Ann E. Conaway Stilson, The “Overloaded” PMSI in Bankruptcy: A
Problem in Search of a Resolution, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 31 (1987).
43

U.C.C. § 9-107 (1995). Revised Article 9 first hyphenated “Purchase-money” in 2001.

44

In re Billings, 838 F.2d 405, 408-09 (10th Cir. 1988).
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In Billings, the debtors and the purchase-money secured creditor refinanced a
purchase-money loan for consumer goods by cancelling the original promissory note
and replacing it with a new note and security agreement.45 After filing for
bankruptcy, the debtors attempted to avoid the security interest by using 11 U.S.C.
522(f)(2), contending that the security interest was no longer purchase-money.46 The
court rejected the argument that a security interest cannot be a purchase-money
security interest if the collateral secures more than its purchase price.47 According to
the court, such a result “ignores the precise wording of the Uniform Commercial
Code.”48 The language “to the extent” in section 9-107 “would be meaningless if an
obligation could never be considered only partly a purchase money debt.”49 Other
circuit, district, and bankruptcy courts have also adopted this rationale.50
Courts that apply the transformation rule—the purchase-money security
interest is transformed into a nonpurchase-money security interest—typically base
their decision on section 9-107, which states that the obligation of a purchase-money
security interest is the purchase price or enabling loan of the collateral.51 When a
purchase-money security interest includes a future advance clause and the secured
party makes a future advance, the obligation is no longer only the price or enabling
loan; consequently, the security interest is not a purchase-money security interest.52
When the obligation of a purchase-money security interest is refinanced or renewed
and a new obligation created, the new obligation does not enable the debtor to
purchase or acquire rights in the collateral because the debtor already has those

45
46

A very small cash advance ($9.67) accompanied the refinancing. Id. at 406.
Id.

47

Id. at 410.

48

Id. at 408.

49

Id.

50

See Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc., 742 F.2d 797, 800-01 (3rd Cir. 1984); In re Geist, 79 B.R.
939, 942 (D. Wyo. 1987); In re McAllister, 267 B.R. 614, 620 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001); In re Short, 170
B.R. 128, 136 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994); In re Russell, 29 B.R. 270, 273 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); In re
Conn, 16 B.R. 454, 457 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Gibson, 16 B.R. 257, 267 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1981).

51

See, e.g., In re Manuel, 507 F.2d 990, 993 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Norrell, 426 F. Supp. 435, 436 (M.D.
Ga. 1977).

52

Manuel, 502 F.2d at 993.
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rights.53 Consequently, the transaction does not satisfy the “present consideration”
requirement described by the drafters in section 9-107, Official Comment 2.54
In re Simpson is the oft-cited seminal case for the proposition that a security
interest cannot be purchase-money if the obligation secured includes future
advances, although the case was decided on other grounds.55 In Simpson the security
interest secured the purchase price of farm equipment and the security agreement
provided that the collateral was security for “future indebtedness.”56 At that time,
U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(c) did not require filing a financing statement in order to perfect a
purchase-money security interest in farm equipment having a purchase price not in
excess of $2500.00.57 When the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the trustee in
bankruptcy moved to avoid the security interest, contending it was unperfected
because the “future indebtedness” clause prevented the security interest from being a
purchase-money security interest.58 The court explained that, except for the “future
indebtedness” provision, the security agreement would have created a purchasemoney security interest.59 Citing the drafters’ statement in section 9-107, Official
Comment 2 that a security interest taken as security for a pre-existing claim or
antecedent debt is excluded from purchase-money status, the court found no
distinction between an antecedent debt and a future advance.60 Either type of debt
53

In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1984).

54

“When a purchase money interest is claimed by a secured party who is not a seller, he must of
course have given present consideration.” U.C.C. § 9-107 cmt. 2 (1962).
55

In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 243, 247 (W.D. Mich. 1966). The issue was perfection of
the security interest, and the referee in bankruptcy held that the security interest was perfected by the
secured party’s possession of the collateral.

56

Id. at 246.

57

U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(c) (1962). The secured party nevertheless filed a financing statement. However,
the filed financing statement did not perfect the security interest because the secured party did not file
the financing statement in the county of the debtor’s residence, as was required by Michigan’s version
of section 9-401. In previous official texts of Article 9, section 9-401 stipulated the office where the
secured party must file the financing statement. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-401 (1995).
58

Simpson, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. (CBC) at 249.

59

Id.

60

When a purchase money interest is claimed by a secured party who is not a seller,
he must of course have given present consideration. This Section therefore
provides that the purchase money party must be one who gives value “by making
advances or incurring an obligation”: the quoted language excludes from the
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could prevent purchase-money status.61 Other courts have agreed with the Simpson
rationale.62
Courts also applied the transformation rule when the parties refinanced the
purchase-money obligation. In re Matthews is representative of those cases.63 The
secured party refinanced the original purchase-money loan and issued a new loan
from which the debtors paid off the original loan and received additional cash.64
Upon filing for bankruptcy, the debtors attempted to avoid the security interest in
the collateral using 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), arguing that the security interest was no longer
purchase-money.65 The court agreed with the “vast majority of courts” that
refinancing by paying off the old loan and extending a new loan extinguishes the
purchase-money character of the original loan because the debtor does not use the
new loan to acquire rights in the collateral.66 The court cited approvingly the words
of the comment to section 9-107 that excluded pre-existing claims or antecedent
debt obligations from purchase-money status.67

purchase money category any security interest taken as security for or in satisfaction
of a preexisting claim or antecedent debt.
U.C.C. § 9-107 cmt. 2 (1962).
61 The court recognized the “to the extent” language of section 9-107 but believed that the comment
to the section indicated that the drafters did not intend such a literal reading. Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (CBC) at 247.
62

See generally In re Freeman, 956 F.2d 252 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding if a security interest secures some
other type of debt, it is not a purchase-money security interest); In re Manuel, 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.
1975) (security interest was not purchase-money because the collateral did not solely secure its price);
In re Norrell, 426 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (finding the security agreement provided that
collateral covered indebtedness other than its price and thus there was no purchase-money security
interest in any collateral); In re Jones, 5 B.R. 655 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980) (reasoning the presence of a
future advance clause is sufficient to extinguish the purchase money character of the security interest).

63

In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1984); see also In re Keeton, 161 B.R. 410 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1993); In re Hipps, 89 B.R. 264 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988); In re Faughn, 69 B.R. 18 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1986).
64

Matthews, 724 F.2d at 799.

65

Id. at 799-800.

66

Id. at 800.

67

Id. at 801.
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The refinancing cases arguably present the best case for applying the
transformation rule. If the purchase-money obligation is refinanced in a transaction
that cancels the original obligation and extends a new loan, then the purchase-money
collateral arguably does not secure the purchase price of the collateral or enable the
debtor to purchase the collateral because the debtor does not acquire the collateral
with the new loan. The essence of purchase-money, both then and now, is that the
value the secured party gives the debtor enables the debtor to acquire the collateral
or rights in the collateral.68
Some courts employed the dual status or transformation rule depending on
whether the contract or other law provided a method for allocating payments. In
Southtrust Bank of Alabama, National Association v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corporation, the
secured party contended that the court should adopt a “to the extent” rule based on
the literal language of U.C.C. § 9-107.69 The court rejected this offer, stating that
“[u]nless a lender contractually provides some method for determining the extent to
which each item of collateral secures its purchase money, it effectively gives up its
purchase money status.”70 The bankruptcy judge in In re Slay agreed with the
principle that, when a purchase-money loan is consolidated with a nonpurchasemoney loan, the lender gives up its purchase-money status because “there is no
method of apportioning the loan between purchase money and nonpurchase money
and no method of applying the payments to the parts.”71 However, the court
allowed part purchase-money status because the debtor made no payments and the
court could “easily determine the amount of the purchase money debt.”72 The same
bankruptcy judge applied the transformation rule in a case in which no
apportionment method existed, stating that “[w]ithout some guidelines, legislative or
68

U.C.C. § 9-103(a), (b)(1) (2005); U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972); U.C.C. § 9-107 (1962).

69

Southtrust Bank of Ala., Nat’l Ass’n v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240, 1243 (11th
Cir. 1985). Although the secured party had a security interest in the debtor’s inventory and the issue
was priority of a purchase-money security interest, the court saw “no reason to limit the holding of In
re Manuel to consumer bankruptcy cases.” Id. at 1242.
70

Id. at 1243.

71

In re Slay, 8 B.R. 355, 358 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).

72

Id.; see also In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 123 B.R. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In Ionosphere, a case involving
a security interest in equipment, the judge found an appropriate apportionment method from the
culmination of the purchase-money loan consolidation in a series of promissory notes with each series
representing the financed amount of the purchase price of an item of collateral. Ionosphere, 123 B.R. at
173.
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contractual, the court should not be required to distill from a mass of transactions
the extent to which a security interest is purchase money.”73
Not all courts required a contractual or statutory apportionment method as a
condition to applying the dual status rule. In re Conn is one of the first cases in which
a judge created an apportionment method in the absence of a contract or statutory
method.74 The debtors had refinanced a consumer goods purchase-money
obligation and received an additional $700 in the refinancing transaction.75 After
filing for bankruptcy, they sought to avoid the security interest under 11 U.S.C. §
522(f) on the grounds that the refinancing destroyed the purchase-money status.76
Although recognizing the difficulty of apportioning the debt, even when a
contractual or statutory allocation method exists, the court stated that the task “is
not so burdensome that a court cannot apply its own formula in the absence of a
contractual or statutory apportionment method.”77 It adopted a “first-in, first-out”
method under which payments were applied “to the price of items in the order in
which those items were purchased.”78 For the refinanced loan, payments were
applied first to the outstanding balance of the first note that had been transferred to
the second note.79 The court believed that this method could be easily applied,
facilitated fairness, and created certainty of result for the parties.80 Other courts have
agreed.81
73

Coomer v. Barclays Am. Fin., Inc., 8 B.R. 351, 355 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).

74

In re Conn, 16 B.R. 454, 458 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982).

75

Id. at 455.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 458.

78

Id.

79

Id. at 459.

80

Id.

81

See In re Short, 170 B.R. 128, 136 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994) (applying first-in first-out to purchasemoney loan consolidated with nonpurchase-money loan); In re Clark, 156 B.R. 693, 695 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1993) (applying first-in first-out methodology in the absence of a provision in the loan
documents); In re Parsley, 104 B.R. 72, 75 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1988) (first-in first-out is equitable and
consistent with legislative intent and state concerns); In re Russell, 29 B.R. 270, 274 (Bankr. W.D.
Okla. 1983) (first-in first-out is an easily-applied rule of thumb that promotes equity and certainty); In
re Gibson, 16 B.R. 257, 269 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (a lien is a purchase-money lien until the purchase
price of the item is paid applying a first-in, first-out method of payment allocation).
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Reviewing these cases reveals that there was no uniform approach by courts.
A court could cite section 9-107 and its comment to justify adopting dual status or
transformation. Likewise, if a debtor had made a payment of the debt, a court could
base its decision on its inability to determine the constituent parts of the security
interest. Thus, legislative action was needed.
III.

EARLY DRAFTS OF SECTION 9-103 OF REVISED ARTICLE 9

Section 9-107 had defined “purchase-money security interest” since the
inception of UCC Article 9.82 The 1972 amendments to Article 9 made no changes
to section 9-107.83 In 1990, the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) for the Uniform
Commercial Code established a committee to study Article 9 and recommend any
revisions.84 This would be the opportunity for the drafters to decide whether to
adopt transformation or dual status. The committee’s drafts provide insight into
their intent.
A. The 1992 PEB Study Committee Report

The PEB Study Committee chose dual status.85 It proposed revisions to
section 9-107 to clarify that: 1) a security interest can be a purchase-money security
interest notwithstanding that the security interest secures non-purchase-money debt;
and 2) a renewal, refinancing, or other restructuring does not terminate the purchase
money status of a security interest.86 Although noting the opposing view of a
82

U.C.C. § 9-107 (1962).

83

Compare U.C.C. § 9-107 (1962), with U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972).

84

See PEB REPORT, supra note 26, at 1. The American Law Institute (ALI) and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the sponsors of the Permanent
Editorial Board, concurred in the establishment of a study committee. Id. Throughout the drafting
process, the various committees studying Article 9 presented drafts to ALI and to NCCUSL.
Occasionally the drafts differed, but mostly they included the same recommendations.
85
86

PEB REPORT, supra note 26, at 97.

“The definition of ‘purchase-money security interest’ (PMSI) in § 9-107 should be revised to make
clear that:
1. A security interest may be a PMSI notwithstanding (i) the fact that the collateral
also secures other, non-purchase money debt ….
2. A renewal, refinancing, or other restructuring of the debt secured does not
destroy the purchase money character of a security interest.”
PEB REPORT, supra note 26, at 97.
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substantial body of case law, the committee stated that the proposed revisions
“would yield the results that obtain under a proper application of current law.”87 Use
of the phrase “a proper application of current law” evidences the committee’s belief
that the “to the extent” language of section 9-107 already warranted dual status.
Additional reasons for recommending dual status listed by the committee were: 1) it
gives the parties flexibility in deciding what collateral secures the obligations; 2) the
favored treatment of purchase-money security interests; and 3) consensual
refinancing should not be discouraged.88 The recommended definition treated all
purchase-money security interests the same regardless of the type of goods.
A further recommendation from the study committee was that the drafting
committee should “consider” whether to adopt an allocation of payments formula to
operate in the absence of agreement by the parties.89 The study committee
recommended only that the drafting committee consider a formula because they “did
not reach consensus on the desirability of including a formula.”90 Their stated
concerns were whether a formula would yield “appropriate results under a wide array
of circumstances” and whether a statutory formula would restrict the parties’ ability
to allocate payments by agreement.91
B. Drafts of the Purchase-Money Security Interest Definition

A drafting committee was established in 1993 pursuant to the
recommendation of the study committee.92 The drafting committee published a
discussion draft for the American Law Institute (ALI) dated April 16, 1996. The
87Id.

at 98. The “Committee Recommendations” additionally approved purchase-money status
notwithstanding that the purchase-money debt is secured by other collateral and placed the burden of
proving the extent to which the security interest is purchase-money, including allocation of payments
between purchase-money and non-purchase-money, on the secured party. Id. at 97.
88

Id. at 98.

89

Id. at 99. Because the committee had recommended that the secured party bear the burden of
proving the extent to which the security interest was a purchase-money security interest, they
suggested the parties include an allocation formula in the security agreement. Id.
90

Id.

91

Id. at 99-100.

92

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 9 at xxxi (Discussion Draft, Apr. 16, 1996)
[hereinafter “April 1996 Discussion Draft”]. Many of the various drafts are reproduced by the Biddle
Law
Library
Archives
at
the
University
of
Pennsylvania
Law
School,
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ulc.htm#ucc9.
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published draft defined purchase-money security interest in proposed section 9107.93 The committee adopted the dual status rule to retain purchase-money status
both when the purchase-money collateral secures other obligations and when the
purchase-money obligation is renewed, refinanced, or restructured.94 The definition
applied to all purchase-money security interests, and consumer goods purchasemoney security interests were likewise protected by the dual status rule.95
The drafting committee also adopted a payment application rule, which
applied to all purchase-money security interests.96 Under the rule, payments are
allocated in accordance with the parties’ reasonable agreement, or in the absence of
such agreement, in accordance with intention of the obligor, or in the absence of
intention, first to unsecured obligations and then to purchase-money obligations in
the order they were incurred.97
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) draft included a payment application rule similar to the ALI Draft.
However, the Reporters for the NCCUSL draft advised the drafting committee
against including an allocation formula.98 They based their reservations on the belief
that “[a]ny [allocation] scheme has potential for mischief, such [as] forcing a

93

April 1996 Discussion Draft, supra note 92, at 21. The committee wrote the statutory text of the
draft on February 15, 1996. See April 1996 Discussion Draft, supra note 92, at xxxi. Although the
Reporters’ Prefatory Comments to the April Draft refer to a November 15, 1995 draft of revisions to
Article 9, I have been unable to locate a copy of it. See id. I have no reason to think it would have
defined purchase-money security interest differently.

94

Id. at 22. The February 1996 NCCUSL Draft published the same dual status rule as the ALI.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 9 at § 9-107(e) (Draft, Feb. 1996) [hereinafter
“February 1996 NCCUSL Draft”], available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucc9/
fb96ucc9.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
95

Throughout this article, I use the term “consumer goods purchase-money security interest” to mean
a purchase-money security interest in a consumer-goods transaction.
96

The new payment application rule adopted by the drafting committee is the same as the current
U.C.C. § 9-103(e).

97

April 1996 Discussion Draft, supra note 92, at 22. The only difference between the Discussion
Draft and the current section 9-103 is in the numbering of the subparts of the section.

98

See February 1996 NCCUSL Draft, supra note 94, at § 9-107(e), Reporters’ Explanatory Note 5,
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucc9/fb96ucc9.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2011). The ALI Draft did not include section notes.
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prepayment of low interest debt while leaving outstanding high interest debt.”99 As
support for this belief, the committee referred to experience under the Bankruptcy
Code indicating that the determination of when a debt was incurred, as would be
required by section 9-107, “is not so simple.”100 Finally, the committee recognized
that other statutes could provide an allocation method different from Article 9, thus
creating a conflict of laws.101
C. Report of the Consumer Issues Subcommittee of the UCC Article 9 Drafting Committee

The Consumer Issues Subcommittee was established to consider and make
recommendations regarding consumer issues in the Article 9 revision process.102
One issue the subcommittee examined was the effect of the proposed dual status
rule on a consumer goods purchase-money security interest. The subcommittee
agreed with the recommendation of the drafting committee that a purchase-money
security interest can be dual status.103 The subcommittee’s reasoning was rooted in
the wording of existing section 9-107. The subcommittee noted that although
section 9-107 did not specifically continue purchase-money status after a refinancing,
it did provide that a security interest is purchase-money “‘to the extent that it is
taken’ by the seller to secure the price or by a lender who makes a loan to enable the
debtor to acquire the collateral.”104 Such language “provides a strong argument that
the drafters contemplated that a debt might be partly purchase money and partly
non-purchase money.”105
99

Id.

100

Id. The Bankruptcy Code reference was to 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982) (effective Nov. 6, 1978),
the “ordinary course of business” exception to avoidance of a preference. As originally enacted,
section 547(c)(2) created an exception for ordinary course payments made not later than 45 days after
the debt was incurred, thus requiring the determination of when the debt was incurred.
101

February 1996 NCCUSL Draft, supra note 94, at § 9-107(e), Reporters’ Explanatory Note 5.

102

REPORT OF THE CONSUMER ISSUES SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE UCC ARTICLE 9 DRAFTING
COMMITTEE (1996), reprinted in 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 332, Ed. Note (1996) [hereinafter
“CONSUMER ISSUES SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT”]. Previously, the chair of the Article 9 Drafting
Committee had formed a Consumer Issues Task Force to achieve that result, but the task force never
reached agreement on consumer proposals. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Consumer Provisions in Revised
Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1255, 1257 (1999).
103

CONSUMER ISSUES SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 102, at 341-42.

104

Id. at 341.

105

Id.
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The report notes that the consumer representatives on the subcommittee
asked that the dual status recommendation of the drafting committee not apply to
consumer loans.106 Their goal was to preserve the power of bankruptcy courts to
apply the transformation rule to a refinanced purchase-money security interest in
consumer goods so that a debtor could avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interest using 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).107 The subcommittee, however, rejected
limiting the scope of dual status. Instead, they recommended adding a comment to
section 9-107 to clarify that bankruptcy courts are free to apply the transformation
rule.108 This decision seems based partly on their observation that many bankruptcy
judges rest their decisions regarding dual status on section 9-107, because the
Bankruptcy Code does not define purchase-money security interest.109 Nevertheless,
the subcommittee agreed that bankruptcy judges are free to reject the Article 9
definition of purchase-money security interest if they believe the policy of the
Bankruptcy Code justifies a different result.110
The subcommittee was aware that some courts apply the transformation rule
after a refinancing accompanied by a future advance because they are unable to
determine which part of the loan is purchase-money and which part is nonpurchasemoney.111 The report commented favorably on the various approaches courts had
taken to solving that problem: using the apportionment rule stated in the agreement,
adopting a statutorily mandated rule, or fashioning their own rule.112 It also
observed, “We are told that currently, most consumer purchase money contracts
provide a method of allocation of payments after a consolidation or refinancing, so

106

Id. The report did not disclose the names of the consumer representatives. The subcommittee
members were Professor Marion Benfield, Chair, Henry Kittleson, Sandra Stern, and Neil Cohen. Id.
at 332, Ed. Note.
107

Id. at 341.

108

Id.

109

Id. at 342. See, e.g., In re Billings, 838 F.2d 405, 406 (10th Cir. 1988); Pristas v. Landaus, 742 F.2d
797, 800 (3rd Cir. 1984); In re Manuel, 507 F.2d 990, 992-93 (5th Cir. 1975).

110 CONSUMER ISSUES SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 102, at 342. Official Comment 8 to
U.C.C. § 9-103 expresses that opinion.
111

CONSUMER ISSUES SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 102, at 341.

112

Id..
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that the apportionment problem rationale for denying ‘dual status’ has largely
disappeared.”113
D. Changes to the Payment Rule for a Consumer Goods Purchase-Money Security Interest

Without explanation, the reporters for the drafting committee added an
application-of-payments rule applicable only to a “consumer secured transaction” in
the October 1996 draft.114
This subsection applies to a consumer secured transaction [and may
not be varied by agreement]. If the extent to which a security interest
is a purchase money security interest depends on the application of a
payment to a particular obligation[, notwithstanding any contrary
agreement,] the payment is to be applied first to obligations that are
not secured and then, if more than one obligation is secured, to
obligations secured by purchase money security interests in the order
in which those obligations were incurred. [This subsection may not
be varied by agreement.]115
This provision imposed a payment rule on the parties, and any agreement to
the contrary would be invalid. Ostensibly, the proposed rule protected the consumer
because any payment method included in the parties’ agreement, which would likely
favor the secured party, would be invalid. It offered some consolation to the secured
party because any unsecured debt would be paid first, leaving the collateral to secure

113

Id.

114

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVISED ARTICLE 9 at § 9-104(e) (Draft, Oct. 1996) [hereinafter
“October 1996 NCCUSL Draft”], available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucc9/
m10draft.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2011). The reporters were Professors Charles W. Mooney, Jr. of
the University of Pennsylvania and Steven L. Harris of the University of Illinois. The draft adopted a
tentative definition of “consumer secured transaction” as a transaction in which an individual incurs
an obligation for personal, family or household purposes secured by collateral used for personal,
family or household purposes. Id. § 9-102(a)(8). The definition of “purchase-money security interest”
moved from section 9-107 to section 9-104.
115

Id. § 9-104(e). The brackets, present in the original, mean that the drafters had not reached a
consensus. The draft retained the payments rule of the previous draft but made it expressly
inapplicable to a “consumer secured transaction.” Id. § 9-104(d).
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the remaining debt. However, no change was made to the dual status rule.116
Purchase-money status continued regardless of refinancing or future advance.117
The reporter’s minimal comments to the draft do not mention the change or
the reason behind it. However, in the comments to the July 1997 NCCUSL draft,
the drafting committee revealed its rationale for a separate payments rule for
consumers: “The Drafting Committee thinks that freedom of contract with respect
to allocation of payments is likely to be illusory in the consumer setting.
Accordingly, it would adopt a statutory allocation rule that cannot be varied by
agreement.”118
Up to this point in the drafting of Revised Article 9, a dual status rule and a
payment rule for all purchase-money security interests had been adopted in every
draft. Perhaps the addition of the separate payments rule portended the future. In
any event, that uniformity would change abruptly.
IV.

THE “CONSUMER COMPROMISE” SHUTS THE DOOR ON DUAL STATUS
FOR CONSUMER GOODS PURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS

Dual status and payment rules for consumer goods purchase-money security
interests ended in the March 1998 draft for NCCUSL and the April 1998 draft for
ALI.119 Section 9-104 of both drafts continued dual status and payment rules for all
purchase-money security interests except for “consumer-goods transactions.”120 In
the ALI draft, the dual status and payment rules were prefaced with the phrase, “[i]n
116

Id. § 9-104 cmt. 3.

117

Id. § 9-104(f).

118

REVISION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 at § 9-104 cmt. 4 (Draft, July 1997)
[hereinafter “July 1997 NCCUSL Draft”], available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/
ucc9/ucc997.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2011).
119

REVISION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 at § 9-103(h) (Draft, Apr. 1998)
[hereinafter “ALI Proposed Final Draft”], available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/
ucc9/98amdblk.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011); REVISION OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE
9 at § 9-104 cmt. B (Draft, Mar. 1998) [hereinafter “March 1998 NCCUSL Draft”), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucc9/m14draft.htm, (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
120

In both drafts, a “consumer-goods transaction” exists when an individual incurs an obligation for
personal, family or household purposes that is secured by collateral used for personal, family or
household purposes. See ALI Proposed Final Draft, supra note 119, at § 9-102(a)(16), 9-106; March
1998 NCCUSL Draft, supra note 119, at §§ 9-102(a) (16), 9-106.

2011]

ALLOWING DUAL STATUS FOR PURCHASE-MONEY SECURITY
INTERESTS IN CONSUMER-GOODS TRANSACTIONS

33

a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction,” thus disqualifying the rules
from regulating a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods.121 The
NCCUSL draft included a section that had the same effect: “[s]ubsections (c), (d),
and (e) do not apply to a consumer-goods transaction.”122
The changes were the result of the “Consumer Compromise” between
consumer representatives, creditor representatives, the Consumer Issues
Subcommittee, the drafting committee, and the sponsoring organizations.123 The
Consumer Issues Subcommittee had previously recommended dual status and
payment rules for all purchase-money security interests.124 The drafting committee,
ALI, and NCCUSL accepted these recommendations at their 1996 annual
meetings.125 However, that was not the end of the story.
Professor Mooney notes that both consumer and creditor representatives
were “somewhat dissatisfied with the draft of Revised Article 9 as approved in
1996.”126 Professor Benfield observes that “[c]reditor representatives strongly
objected to the pro-consumer provisions that were adopted by the National
Conference and the ALI.”127 That discontent fueled concern that legislative
enactment of Revised Article 9 could be jeopardized,128 and the concern led to a new
undertaking to produce a set of consumer provisions that would be acceptable to
both consumer and creditor representatives.129 The product of the compromise was,
as it related to consumer goods purchase-money security interests, no change to the
121

ALI Proposed Final Draft, supra note 119, at § 9-104(f), (g).

122

March 1998 NCCUSL Draft, supra note 119, at § 9-104(f). Section 9-104, subsections (c), (d), and
(e) were, respectively, the payment, dual status, and burden of proof rules.
123

Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Consumer Provisions in Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1255, 1258-59
(1999). Professor Benfield was the chair of the Consumer Issues Subcommittee and a member of the
Drafting Committee. Credit for naming the compromise goes to Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr.
and his illuminating article discussing and critiquing the process and effects of the compromise.
Mooney, supra note 31.
124

See supra notes 80–89 and accompanying text.

125

Benfield, supra note 123, at 1259.

126

Mooney, supra note 31, at 218.

127

Benfield, supra note 123, at 1259.

128

Id.

129

Id.
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existing law. The compromise memorandum provided: “No codification of dual
status or mixed collateral rule for consumers (keep current law).”130 If success is
measured by compromise and the eventual enactment of Revised Article 9, then the
new undertaking was a great success. All fifty states adopted Revised Article 9, most
by the target date of July 1, 2001.131
Success, however, does not necessarily equate with happiness.132 Professor
Benfield remarks that “[i]t is fair to say that neither group was happy with the
proposals, but both believed that the proposals agreed to were such that neither
group would oppose adoption of Revised Article 9 . . . .”133 The Reporters’ Prefatory
Comments to the ALI Proposed Final Draft note the shortcomings of the
compromise: “The statutory text that has emerged is less than ideal in substance and
approach. It represents a balance struck in the hope that it will enhance the
opportunities for prompt and uniform enactment of revised Article 9.”134 Professor
Mooney is more critical of the compromise:
In particular, the near-term benefits of the rapid enactment of
Revised Article 9 may be swamped by the longer-term costs of the
compromise. These costs include the failure of Revised Article 9 to
resolve important and controversial issues in consumer secured
transactions and the inclusion of unwise and incoherent provisions.135
Regardless of any residual displeasure, the compromise held and is retained in
section 9-103 of Revised Article 9.
130

Memorandum of Consumer and Creditor Understanding of Proposal on Consumer Issues, reprinted
in Mooney, supra note 31, at 228. The compromise memorandum is reprinted in its entirety in
Professor Mooney’s article.
131

Mooney, supra note 31, at 215-16. The states that did not hit the target were Alabama, January 1,
2002; Connecticut, October 1, 2001; Florida, January 1, 2002; and Mississippi, January 1, 2002.
132

See Jean Braucher, Deadlock: Consumer Transactions Under Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 83, 116
(1999).

133

Benfield, supra note 123, at 1259.

134REVISION

OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9, REPORTERS’ PREFATORY COMMENTS at
4j, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucc9/am98pr.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2011). The complete comments of the reporters regarding consumer transactions appear in the ALI
Proposed Final Draft, pages xliv-vii, and a less complete version in the March 1998 NCCUSL Draft,
Reporters’ Prefatory Note.

135

Mooney, supra note 31, at 216.
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The compromise also produced an accompanying change to clarify the
drafters’ intent regarding the effect of the limitation on a consumer goods purchasemoney security interest. Section 9-104(i) of the ALI Proposed Final Draft
admonished courts to draw no inference from the limitation of the dual status and
payment rules to purchase-money security interests other than consumer-goods
transactions:
The limitation of the rules . . . to transactions other than consumergoods transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination
of the proper rules in consumer-goods transactions. The court may
not draw from that limitation an inference as to the nature of the
proper rule in consumer-goods transactions, and the court may
continue to apply established approaches.136
The NCCUSL draft suggested that a similar statement should be added to the
Official Comment for the section.137 The ALI prevailed, and that statement now
appears in current section 9-103(h). Consequently, determining the effect of a
refinancing or a future advance on a consumer goods purchase-money security
interest in the twenty-first century was essentially left to the same rules that existed in
the 1962 Official Text of Article 9.138
V.

THE CASE FOR ADOPTING DUAL STATUS UNDER REVISED ARTICLE 9

In most states the courts must settle the issue of whether a consumer goods
purchase-money security interest retains purchase-money status after the secured
party makes a future advance or refinances the purchase-money obligation.139 The
starting point for most courts will be the purchase-money security interest definition
in section 9-103, regardless that the dual status and payment rules of section 9-103
are inapplicable to consumer-goods transactions. The purchase-money security
interest definition in sections 9-103(a) and (b) applies to all security interests. I assert
136

ALI Proposed Final Draft, supra note 119, at § 9-104(i), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/archives/ulc/ucc9/ucc9amg.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
137

March 1998 NCCUSL Draft, supra note 119, at § 9-104 cmt. A.

138

Braucher, supra note 132 at, 97-98. Professor Braucher labels the failure of the drafters to resolve
this issue as “we punt.” Id.
139

Nine states have settled this issue with legislation that amends section 9-103 to apply the dual
status and payment rules to purchase-money security interests in consumer goods. See infra Part VII.
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that the purchase-money definition compels the result that a consumer goods
transaction can be part purchase-money and part nonpurchase-money under that
definition.
The definition of purchase-money security interest has three aspects: the
definition of purchase-money security interest, the definition of purchase-money
collateral, and the definition of purchase-money obligation. A security interest in
goods is a purchase-money security interest “to the extent that the goods are
purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest.”140 Collateral is
purchase-money collateral when it is connected to a purchase-money obligation.141
“‘[P]urchase-money collateral means goods or software that secures a purchasemoney obligation incurred with respect to that collateral.”142 An obligation is
purchase-money when it is connected to obtaining the collateral.143 “‘[P]urchasemoney obligation means an obligation of an obligor incurred as all or part of the
price of the collateral or for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or
the use of the collateral if the value is in fact so used.”144 In simple terms, a
purchase-money security interest exists when the secured party loans the debtor (by
installment sale or actual loan) the purchase price of the collateral and the debtor
grants a security interest in the collateral purchased to secure the loan.145
To illustrate these definitions, assume that a lender loans money to an
individual to enable her to purchase a television for personal use. The individual
grants the lender a security interest in the television to secure the loan. From its
inception, the loan to purchase the television is a purchase-money obligation: the
individual received “value” from the secured party that enabled her to acquire the

140

U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(1).

141

§ 9-103(a)(1).

142

Id.

143

§ 9-103(a)(2).

144

Id. The two-part definition of purchase-money obligation allows a seller of the collateral (“price of
the collateral”) or a lender that advances the purchase-money (“value given to enable the debtor to
acquire rights in … the collateral”) to obtain a purchase-money security interest. Id.
145 The debtor and the obligor can be different persons. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28), (59). For example,
a purchase-money security interest exists when mother (obligor) borrows money from a bank to
purchase a car that will be owned by daughter (debtor) and daughter grants the bank a security
interest in the car to secure the loan.
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television.146 Similarly, the television is purchase-money collateral. It is a good that
secures the money loaned to enable the individual to purchase the collateral—“a
purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral.”147 The security
interest is completely purchase-money because the only collateral, the television, is
purchase-money collateral and the only obligation, the television loan, is a purchasemoney obligation.148
Does the purchase-money security interest continue after the secured party
agrees to make the debtor another loan and secures that loan with the television?149
It should, because “to the extent” in section 9-103(b)(1) permits the security interest
to be a partial purchase-money security interest. The television continues to secure
the loan made to purchase it regardless of the future advance. That the television
also secures the future advance does not affect its status as securing the loan made to
purchase the television.150 It remains purchase-money collateral because it secures a
purchase-money obligation, and to that extent the security interest is purchasemoney.151 The security interest that exists after the secured party makes a future
advance precisely fits “to the extent” of section 9-103(b). No other interpretation of
the words “to the extent” gives them an appropriate meaning.
The committees that studied the revision of Article 9 would concur in that
interpretation. The PEB Study Committee, commenting on the proposed addition
of an express dual status rule, noted that the rule “would yield the results that obtain
under a proper application of current law.”152 The Consumer Issues Subcommittee
stated that “to the extent” in section 9-107 “provides a strong argument that the

146

See U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2).

147

See § 9-103(a)(1).

148

See § 9-103(b)(1).

149

The additional loan is a future advance under U.C.C. § 9-204(c). Because most security
agreements, purchase-money or otherwise, include a future advance clause, the existing collateral
serves as collateral for the new loan without the debtor executing another security agreement. See id.

150

The priority rules of Article 9 (U.C.C. §§ 9-317 to 9-339, primarily U.C.C. § 9-322(a)) would
determine the priority of the security interest for the future advance.

151

U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(1).

152

PEB REPORT, supra note 26, at 98.

38

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 13

drafters contemplated that a debt might be partly purchase money and partly nonpurchase money.”153 The opinions of academics reached the same conclusion.154
All those sources were commenting on section 9-107. Although the basic
purchase-money definition was not changed, sections 9-103(e) and (f) disqualify the
dual status and payment rules from applying to a consumer-goods transaction.155
Those limitations raise the question of whether “to the extent” in section 9-103(b)
should apply in determining whether a consumer-goods purchase-money security
interest remains purchase-money after a future advance or a refinancing.
“To the extent” should apply to determine whether a consumer goods
security interest is a purchase-money security interest. The scope limitations in
section 9-103 appear only in sections 9-103(e), (f), and (g).156 Those sections pertain
to, respectively, payments, dual status, and burden of proof. Sections 9-103(a) and
(b), the purchase-money security interest definition sections, include no such
limitation, and they should apply to all security interests unless some other limitation
exists. Section 9-103(h) comments on the limitation, but does not enlarge it. It
simply expresses the drafters’ intention that courts must resolve issues of payment
and dual status, drawing no inference from the limitations.157 Section (h) makes no
statement that subsections (a) and (b) are inapplicable to deciding the issue of
purchase-money status for a consumer-goods security interest. The collective effect
153

CONSUMER ISSUES SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 102, at 341..

154

See Mary Aronov, The Transformation Rule Applied to Purchase Money Security Interests in Commercial
Lending Transactions, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 15, 42 (1985); Bernard A. Burk, Preserving the Purchase
Money Status of Refinanced or Commingled Purchase Money Debt, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1157-58 (1983);
Robert M. Lloyd, Refinancing Purchase Money Security Interests, 53 TENN. L. REV. 1, 64 (1985); Gerald T.
McLaughlin, “Add On” Clauses in Equipment Purchase Money Financing: Too Much of a Good Thing, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 680 (1981); Ann E. Conaway Stilson, The “Overloaded” PMSI in Bankruptcy: A
Problem in Search of a Resolution, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 36 (1987).
155

U.C.C. § 9-103(e), (f).

156

The rule of U.C.C. § 9-103(g), which places the burden of proving the extent to which a security
interest is purchase-money on the secured party, is limited to “a transaction other than a consumergoods transaction.”
157

“The limitation of the rules in subsections (e), (f), and (g) to transactions other than consumergoods transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in
consumer-goods transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation the nature of the proper
rule in consumer-goods transactions and may continue to apply established approaches.” U.C.C. § 9103(h).
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of those sections causes the definition in subsections 9-103(a) and (b) to govern all
security interests.
Courts have the responsibility of determining the proper rule to apply when
deciding the issue, but they nevertheless are bound by the purchase-money definition
in section 9-103. They must apply the statutory definition to the transaction.158 A
proper application yields a dual status purchase-money security interest because a
security interest can be purchase-money “to the extent that the goods are purchasemoney collateral with respect to that security interest.”159 A security interest in
consumer goods that begins as a purchase-money security interest remains purchasemoney to the extent of the purchase-money obligation but is nonpurchase-money to
the extent of the future advance.160 That result fits the definition.
A refinancing or renewal of a purchase-money security interest obligation
also raises the issue of whether a security interest remains purchase-money.161 Those
transactions take various forms, from simply extending the repayment period of the
loan to canceling the original obligation and replacing it with a new obligation and
security agreement.162 Consequently, they do not engage the dual status rule literally
because the obligation created is based entirely on the purchase-money transaction.163
If the secured obligation is purchase-money only, dual status is not an issue.
Nevertheless, most courts facing the issue refer to “dual status” in their analysis, and
I will do likewise. Because Article 9 treats refinancing, renewal, restructuring, and
158

See generally In re Geist, 79 B.R. 939 (D. Wyo. 1987) (rejecting the transformation rule because it
conflicts with U.C.C. language).
159

U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(1). The drafters recognize that courts “have found this rule to be explicit or
implicit in the words ‘to the extent.’” Id. § 9-103 cmt. 7a.
160

See Part VI for discussion of the effect on the security interest of a payment.

161

The dual status rule of section 9-103(f)(3) treats refinancing, renewal, restructuring, and
consolidation the same way—the security interest remains purchase-money after that event. Article 9
does not define those terms. See supra notes 2 and 3. Official Comment 7.b explains that whether a
security interest transaction comes within those terms, and thus the security interest remains
purchase-money, depends on whether “the purchase-money character of the security interest fairly
can be said to survive.” U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 7b.
162
163

See, e.g., In re Short, 170 B.R. 128, 134 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994).

That assumes no future advance accompanies the refinancing. Frequently, however, an additional
loan is made with the refinancing or the purchase-money loan is consolidated with a non-purchasemoney loan. Such transactions clearly raise the dual status issue.
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consolidation the same, I will refer only to “refinancing” when discussing these
transactions.164
Courts holding that a refinancing destroys the purchase-money status of a
security interest typically rely on the statutory requirement that the collateral must
secure the debt that was incurred to purchase the collateral.165 In most refinancing
situations, a new debt replaces the previous purchase-money debt, and the purchasemoney collateral secures the new debt. Thus, a court can find that purchase-money
collateral secures an obligation that is no longer a literal purchase-money obligation;
consequently, the transaction no longer satisfies the purchase-money security interest
definition.
But does that result exalt form over substance?166 Judge Dietz, in In re Conn,
argues that it does:
Though in form the original note is cancelled, its balance is absorbed
into the refinancing loan. To the extent of that balance, the purchase
money security interest taken under the original note likewise
survives, because what is owed on the original note is not eliminated,
it is merely transferred to . . . another obligation. The refinancing
changes the character of neither the balance due under the first loan
nor the security interest taken under it.167

164

Note that none of those transactions results in the loss of purchase-money status under the rule of
U.C.C. § 9-103(f)(3).
165

U.C.C. § 9-103(a), (b)(1); U.C.C. § 9-107(b) (1995). See generally In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798 (9th
Cir. 1984); In re Keeton, 161 B.R. 410 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993); In re Hipps, 89 B.R. 264 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1988); In re Faughn, 69 B.R. 18, (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986); In re Jones, 5 B.R. 655, 657 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 1980). Official Comment 2 to section 9-107 of former Article 9 noted that the purchasemoney definition “excludes from the purchase money category any security interest taken as security
for or in satisfaction of a preexisting claim or antecedent debt.” Although the Official Comment to
section 9-103 does not include that statement, the definition of purchase-money security interest in
section 9-103 creates that requirement.
166

See In re Geist, 79 B.R. 939, 942 (D. Wyo. 1987); Carlson, supra note 17, at 851.

167 In re Conn, 16 B.R. 454, 459 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). In Conn, the borrower also received an
additional $700 in the refinancing transaction. Id. at 455. Cf. In re Geist, 79 B.R. 939, 942 (D. Wyo.
1987); In re Richardson, 47 B.R. 113, 117 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985); In re Russell, 29 B.R. 270, 273
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983); In re Stevens, 24 B.R. 536, 538 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982).
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His reasoning is sound. If the transaction was born as a purchase-money
security interest, then the initial obligation is also purchase-money. The purchasemoney obligation has a balance due when the final payment day arrives. If the
parties agree to refinance the outstanding balance and secure the resulting debt with
a security interest in the purchase-money collateral, technically the new debt is not a
“purchase-money obligation” because it does not enable the debtor to obtain the
collateral; the debtor already has the collateral when the initial loan is refinanced.168
In substance, however, the debt is the same indebtedness that enabled the debtor to
obtain the collateral: a purchase-money obligation.169 That the new debt might carry
a different due date or interest rate should not obscure the fact that it is still the
purchase-money debt.170 Though the debt wears a different label, it is nonetheless
the same debt underneath. It is the debt for the purchase-money of the collateral.
To hold otherwise puts form above substance.
A valid inquiry for determining whether the refinanced debt remains
purchase-money is whether “the purchase-money character of the security interest
fairly can be said to survive.”171 In allowing a refinanced loan to remain purchasemoney, the drafters of Revised Article 9 base that status on whether “an identifiable
portion of the purchase-money obligation could be traced to the new obligation . . .
.”172 That tracing is not complicated. For example, if a debtor refinances a purchasemoney obligation that has a balance of $1000, then $1000 of the new obligation is
purchase-money regardless of the total amount of the new obligation. In fact, it is
difficult to conceive of a situation in which the purchase-money obligation is not
identifiable in the new obligation. The purchase-money character survives and the
security interest should remain purchase-money.
168

“‘[P]urchase-money obligation’ means an obligation of an obligor incurred as all or part of the
price of the collateral or for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the
collateral if the value is in fact so used.” U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2).

169

Accord In re Fickey, 23 B.R. 586, 590 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (refinancing carried out in form of
new loan does not mean the new loan is completely nonpurchase-money).
170

In re Billings, 838 F.2d 405, 408 n.4 (10th Cir. 1988) (change in interest rate on renewal of debt did
not require finding the original obligation is extinguished); In re Littlejohn, 20 B.R. 695, 698 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1982) (higher interest rate for refinanced loan does not make loan nonpurchase-money).
171
172

U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 7b.

Id. While the drafters are commenting on the dual status rule as it applies to purchase-money
security interests other than consumer-goods transactions, the tracing principle is nevertheless
applicable to a consumer goods purchase-money security interest.
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A. Is a Refinancing a Novation?

There is the assertion that a refinanced loan creates a novation.173 Black’s
Law Dictionary defines novation as the “act of substituting for an old obligation a
new one that either replaces an existing obligation with a new obligation or replaces
an original party with a new party.”174 A novation of a purchase-money obligation
could arguably occur when the parties terminate the purchase-money loan and
replace it with a new obligation because the obligation is no longer purchase-money
security. The question is whether a novation results automatically from a refinancing
or only when the parties intend to extinguish the old obligation and replace it with a
new obligation.175 Some courts have found an “automatic” novation, but other
courts look for evidence of the parties’ intent to terminate and replace the purchasemoney obligation.176
Although a refinancing transaction typically produces a new promissory note
or installment contract and perhaps even a new security agreement, it seems unlikely
that the parties, especially the secured creditor, intend to terminate the purchasemoney status of the obligation and replace it with a nonpurchase-money
obligation.177 A secured creditor agreeing to that would be giving up the advantages
of having a purchase-money security interest simply by agreeing to refinance an
existing obligation. There is no benefit to the secured party for agreeing to refinance
a purchase-money loan, other than perhaps a higher rate of interest on the
refinanced obligation.178 And except in bankruptcy, replacing the purchase-money

173

See In re Schwartz, 52 B.R. 314, 315-16 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); In re Richardson, 47 B.R. 113, 117,
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985); Carlson, supra note 17, at 848-49; Lloyd, supra note 154, at 56-63.
174

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1094 (7th ed. 1999).

175

Lloyd, supra note 154, at 59-60.

176

Compare In re Jones, 5 B.R. 655, 657 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1980), and In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798, 800
(9th Cir. 1984), with In re Cantrill Constr. Co., 418 F.2d 705, 706-07 (6th Cir. 1969), In re Johnson, 15
B.R. 681, 684-85 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981), and Wells Fargo Fin. Ky., Inc. v. Thomer, 315 S.W.3d 335,
338-39 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010).
177

See Carlson, supra note 17, at 850-52. Because most security agreements include a future advance
clause, there is no need to have the debtor authenticate a new security agreement. The new obligation
is secured by the purchase-money collateral pursuant to the future advance clause. U.C.C. § 9-204(c).
A new security agreement is needed if the secured party adds collateral to the security interest.

178

If the obligor is in default on the obligation, the refinancing creates the opportunity that the
obligor might be able to pay the debt with the extension of time. Repayment of the debt of course
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obligation with a nonpurchase-money obligation provides no benefit to the debtor.179
Consequently, although a refinancing transaction might produce a new “form” of
obligation, there is no reason to assume that the parties have agreed that the
replacement of the debt in form operates as a substantive termination and
replacement of the purchase-money debt.180 Because a novation that ends purchasemoney status can have drastic consequences for a secured creditor, a refinancing
should not produce a novation unless the parties clearly indicate that intent.181
B. Policy Considerations of Dual Status

If dual status is to be the prevailing rule for consumer goods purchase-money
security interests, it should comport with the policy for the special privileges awarded
to a purchase-money security interest and should not harm the debtor or other
creditors. Section 9-324(a) of Article 9 grants a purchase-money security interest
priority over security interests perfected earlier in time.182 Priority is justified because
the credit the purchase-money secured party gives increases the debtor’s assets by
the value of the purchase-money collateral.183 If a future advance or a refinancing
ends purchase-money status, the previously superior purchase-money security
interest could become a subordinate nonpurchase-money security interest.184 If

benefits the secured party. Refinancing of a debt in default also allows the secured party to delay
implementing the Article 9 remedies against the collateral and the obligor.
179

As noted previously, a debtor who files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy can avoid a nonpurchase-money
security interest in specified consumer goods under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).

180

See In re Conn, 16 B.R. 454, 459-60 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982).

181

See In re Janz, 67 B.R. 553, 556 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986); In re Richardson, 47 B.R. 113, 117 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1985); Lewiston State Bank v. Greenline Equip., L.L.C., 147 P.3d 951, 955 (Utah Ct. App.
2006); see also supra pp. 2-3.
182

U.C.C. § 9-324(a) awards a perfected purchase-money security interest in goods other than
livestock or inventory (thus including consumer goods) priority over other perfected security interests
in the same collateral or the proceeds of the collateral. The “other” security interest involved in a
priority conflict is a security interest that covers after-acquired collateral. Because U.C.C. § 9204(b)(1) limits the life of an after-acquired property clause in consumer goods, other than accessions,
to goods the debtor acquires within ten days of attachment of the security interest, the number of
secured creditors affected by a dual status purchase-money security interest is not large.

183
184

Carlson, supra note 17, at 794.

U.C.C. § 9-322(a) governs priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral when
no specific priority rule applies. It awards priority to the security interest that has the earlier
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purchase-money status is maintained, the priority of the purchase-money part of the
security interest does not change. That is not an unjust outcome; it is the intended
priority scheme of Article 9. The purchase-money secured party has committed no
act that justifies loss of priority in the purchase-money collateral for the purchasemoney obligation. Moreover, the purchase-money priority does not extend to the
nonpurchase-money obligation. Priority for that obligation will be determined by
the applicable Article 9 priority rule, generally section 9-322.185
Another special benefit awarded to a consumer goods purchase-money
security interest is perfection without filing a financing statement or taking other
action.186 This privilege allows a seller or lender that takes a purchase-money security
interest in consumer goods to have a perfected security interest upon satisfying the
attachment requirements.187 If a secured party elects to perfect in this manner, the
security interest becomes unperfected if its status changes from purchase-money to
nonpurchase-money.188 That has drastic consequences in bankruptcy—a trustee in
bankruptcy can avoid an unperfected security interest—or when another perfected
secured party claims an interest in the collateral—perfected security interest has
priority over an unperfected security interest.189 A secured party with a purchasemoney security interest does not contemplate loss of its purchase-money status when
it refinances a debt or makes a future advance and thus likely would not recognize
the need to take action to perfect its security interest.190 Nor has the secured party
perfection or filing date. U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1). Usually, the conflicting security interest would have
the earlier priority date.
185

U.C.C. § 9-322.

186

U.C.C. § 9-309(1) grants perfection upon attachment for a purchase-money security interest in
consumer goods except for goods subject to a statute or treaty as described in U.C.C. 9-311.
Typically, the goods covered by section 9-311 are motor vehicles, so usually there is no perfection
upon attachment for a purchase-money security interest in a consumer good motor vehicle.

187

Attachment of a security interest requires that the secured party give value to the debtor, the
debtor has rights in the collateral, and, generally, the debtor authenticates a security agreement
describing the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-203(a), (b). A secured party can file a financing statement if it
desires, and that filing would prevent a buyer of the collateral from taking free of the security interest
under U.C.C. § 9-320(b).

188

See U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 3.

189

11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2010); U.C.C. § 9-322(a).

190

If there is a nonpurchase-money part of the security interest, such as a future advance, then the
secured party must take action to perfect that part.
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committed any act that justifies loss of perfection. The drafters wanted automatic
perfection for an attached purchase-money security interest in consumer goods.191
Loss of purchase-money status is contrary to that policy.
Allowing continuation of purchase-money status after refinancing or making
a future advance causes no unexpected harm to the debtor. The debtor and secured
party intended a purchase-money security interest from the inception of their
relationship.192 Although the advantages of a purchase-money security interest
benefit the secured party, they do not detriment the debtor. Initially, the debtor
seemingly has little interest in the type of security interest because the obligation is
the same regardless of the type. The debtor is interested in obtaining the collateral.
Only in the event of bankruptcy does the debtor become interested in whether the
security interest is purchase-money. That is because the avoidance power of
Bankruptcy Code section 522(f) applies only to a nonpurchase-money security
interest. Consequently, the debtor may assert that refinancing or making a future
advance ends purchase-money status. Ironically, the very acts that create the
transformation argument are sought by and benefit the debtor. 193 The debtor seeks
refinancing or a future advance to aid in paying the debt or in receiving additional
funds, not for the purpose of gaining a nonpurchase-money security interest.194
Maintaining the purchase-money status does not damage the expectations of the
debtor and thus does not cause the debtor unexpected harm.
Retaining purchase-money status of a purchase-money security interest in
consumer goods does not thwart the intent of Congress in enacting Bankruptcy
Code section 522(f). The Bankruptcy Code permits a valid security interest to trump

191

The reason expressed by the drafters for such perfection is that, prior to adoption of the UCC,
many states did not implement filing requirements for consumer goods under conditional sales or
bailment leases. U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 4. (1962). Perfection without filing for a purchase-money
security interest in consumer goods has always been the rule of Article 9. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1)(d)
(1962), 9-302(1)(d) (1995), 9-309(1) (2005).
192

The parties’ debtor-creditor relationship could predate the purchase-money transaction if an
existing debt is consolidated with the purchase-money obligation into a single debt. See Coomer v.
Barclays Am. Fin., Inc., 8 B.R. 351, 353-54 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980)..
193

One can assert logically that the secured party also benefits from those acts—more interest is likely
paid because of the additional repayment time of a refinancing or increased debt of a future advance.

194

See In re Cantrill Constr. Co., 418 F.2d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1969).
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a debtor’s exemption in the collateral.195 Congress intended for section (f) to
preserve the Bankruptcy Code’s grant of exempt property for individual debtors.196
Their concern emanated from findings that creditors lending money to consumers
frequently took a security interest in all of the debtor’s belongings and then
threatened repossession of those goods if the debtor defaulted.197 To remedy that
situation Congress proposed allowing a debtor to avoid a nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money security interest in specified consumer goods to the extent that
a security interest impairs an exemption. Section (f) has never authorized avoidance
of a purchase-money security interest. Purchase-money creditors do not have the
same motives as creditors with a blanket security interest in consumer goods.198
Purchase-money creditors take a security interest in the goods they enable the debtor
to acquire.199 They do not threaten repossession of all the debtor’s household
goods.200 Maintaining the purchase-money status of a purchase-money security
interest in consumer goods after a future advance or a refinancing is consistent with
the intent of section 522(f).
Lastly, the judicial conversion of a purchase-money security interest to a
nonpurchase-money security interest could result in eventual harm to consumer
debtors. Presumably, a debtor who seeks a future advance or a refinancing has need
for such credit. An existing purchase-money secured party might be willing to
extend the needed credit. If, however, those transactions result in loss of purchasemoney status, the secured party will eventually cease agreeing to extend such
credit.201 Loss of purchase-money status could lead to higher costs for creditors and
might even lead a creditor to forego making purchase-money loans completely.202
195

11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2) (2010).

196

H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 4 (1977).

197

Id.

198

The adoption of Federal Trade Commission regulations, subsequent to the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code, prevents the potential injustice of a blanket security interest in consumer goods. 16
C.F.R. 433.1 (2011).

199

See In re Matthews, 724 F.2d 798, 799 (9th Cir. 1984).

200

See id.

201

Lloyd, supra note 154, at 10.

202

See Benfield, supra note 123, at 1296; Christopher Harry, To Be (Transformed) or Not To Be: The
Transformation Versus Dual-Status Rules for Purchase-Money Security Interests Under Kansas’ Former and Revised
Article 9, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1095, 1132 (2002); Lloyd, supra note 154, at 10.
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Perhaps the debtor can obtain the credit from another creditor, but a new creditor
generates transaction costs borne by the debtor, including additional time spent,
credit checks, and document fees. Many debtors rely on purchase-money financing
to enable them to purchase higher-cost consumer goods. Increased cost or loss of
credit is not a favorable outcome for consumers.
Allowing a consumer goods purchase-money security interest to be dual
status is clearly warranted by the purchase-money definition of sections 9-103(a) and
(b)(1). It is consistent with the intent of the debtor, the secured party, and the
drafters. It does not harm the debtor or other creditors. And if dual status is not
allowed, consumer debtors may suffer increased cost or the loss of credit.
VI.

APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS

Even courts that accept dual status struggle with the effect of a payment.203
After the debtor makes a payment on a debt secured by a dual status purchasemoney security interest, it can be difficult to determine which part of the remaining
obligation is purchase-money and which part is nonpurchase-money.204 When a
court is unable or unwilling to ascertain the amount of each part, the result is that the
security interest loses its dual status and becomes a nonpurchase-money security
interest.205 The payment rules of section 9-103(e) in Revised Article 9 are expressly
inapplicable to consumer goods purchase-money security interests.206 That leaves the
203

Southtrust Bank of Ala., Nat’l Ass’n. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F.2d 1240, 1243.
(11th Cir. 1985); In re Bray, 365 B.R. 850, 859 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2007); Coomer v. Barclays Am.
Fin., Inc., 8 B.R. 351, 354 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980); First Nat’l Bank of Steeleville, N.A. v. Erb
Equip. Co., 921 S.W.2d 57, 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).

204

See Coomer, 8 B.R. at 353. The task for the court is much easier if the parties have agreed on an
application method. The Consumer Issues Subcommittee noted in its May 1996 report that “[w]e are
told that currently, most consumer purchase money contracts provide a method of allocation of
payments after a consolidation or refinancing, so that the apportionment problem rationale for
denying ‘dual status’ has largely disappeared.” CONSUMER ISSUES SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
102, at 341. The number of cases today that involve this issue indicate that many agreements still do
not include such clauses.
205

“Without some guidelines, legislative or contractual, the court should not be required to distill
from a mass of transactions the extent to which a security interest is purchase money.” Coomer, 8
B.R. at 355.
206

“In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, . . . the payment must be applied . . . .”
U.C.C. § 9-103(e).
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issue for the courts.207 To implement the dual status rule that I advocate in Part V,
courts must accept the task of allocating payments between the parts of the security
interest. The burden is not insurmountable.
Before exploring possible solutions, a basic example will illustrate the issue.
Assume the Seller sells the Debtor a consumer-goods computer through an
installment sales agreement and takes a security interest in the computer to secure its
price, $2200.208 The Seller assigns the purchase-money security interest to Finance
Company.209 After the Debtor has paid $500 of the obligation, Finance Company
loans the Debtor $1000 under the future advance clause of the installment sales
agreement. After the future advance, the purchase-money collateral secures the
$1000 nonpurchase-money debt as well as the $1700 purchase-money debt.210
Applying the dual status rule, the security interest is purchase-money to the extent of
$1700 and nonpurchase-money to the extent of $1000. The difficult issue arises
when the Debtor makes a payment on the indebtedness. What part of the debt is
purchase-money and what part is nonpurchase-money?
Perhaps the simplest solution to this problem is for a court to judicially adopt
the payment rules of section 9-103(e). Section 9-103(e) adopts three hierarchical
rules to use for determining which part of a security interest is purchase-money and
which part is nonpurchase-money. First, if the parties have agreed to a “reasonable
method” of applying payments, a court must abide by the agreement.211 Note that a

207

“The limitation of the rules in subsections (e), (f), and (g) to transactions other than consumergoods transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in
consumer-goods transactions.” U.C.C. § 9-103(h).

208

The installment sales agreement includes the loan obligation and constitutes the security
agreement. It functions the same as a security agreement that is separate from the documentation of
the loan obligation.

209

Assignment of the purchase-money obligation to a third party creditor should not cause the
security interest to become nonpurchase-money. In re Penrod, 392 B.R. 835, 838 n. 3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2008); In re Trejos, 374 B.R. 210, 215-17 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007); In re Cole, No. 02-06385-DH, 2003
WL 25932189, at *10 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Dec. 27, 2003); In re Brooks, 74 B.R. 418, 419 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1987); cf. U.C.C. § 9-310(c) cmt. 4.

210

When a security agreement includes a future advance clause, the collateral described in the security
agreement secures all obligations arising thereunder. U.C.C. § 9-204(c).
211

U.C.C. § 9-103(e)(1).
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court is compelled to implement the agreement only if it is reasonable.212 Second, if
no such agreement exists, a court must apply payments pursuant to the intention of
the obligor, whether manifested at the time of payment or before.213 This allows the
obligor to decide how to allocate the payments between purchase-money and
nonpurchase-money parts. Each of these rules requires that the court make a factual
inquiry into whether the parties have agreed to a reasonable method or whether the
obligor has manifested an intention. Third, in the absence of agreement or intention,
the court applies payments first to unsecured obligations, if any, and next to
purchase-money obligations in the order of their occurrence.214 Any nonpurchasemoney secured obligation is paid last. Thus, in the typical dual status security
interest, payments would be applied first to the purchase-money part and next to the
nonpurchase-money part. The factual inquiry of this rule is simply to determine the
amounts of the component parts and the amounts of any payments. This inquiry
seems the least burdensome on the court.
A court is not restricted from judicially adopting the Article 9 payment rules.
The UCC drafters expressly ceded the authority to the court to decide the
appropriate rules for consumer goods purchase-money security interests.215 A court
could exercise its authority by utilizing the section 9-103(e) rules.216 A state
legislature’s choice to follow uniform Revised Article 9 and limit the payment rules
to purchase-money security interests other than consumer-goods transactions does
not preclude the court from implementing them judicially as the rule of law for the

212

Official Comment 7.b observes that an “unconscionable method of application . . . is not a
reasonable one and so would not be given effect under subsection (e)(1).” U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt 7b.

213

U.C.C. § 9-103(e)(2).

214

§ 9-103(e)(3). Official Comment 7b notes that, if the transaction includes more than one purchasemoney security interest, payments are applied to the purchase-money obligations first incurred. With
the increasing use of “dragnet” obligation clauses in which the security interest covers any
indebtedness regardless of type or time, there is small likelihood that the debtor would owe the
creditor an unsecured obligation.
215
216

§ 9-103(h).

Moreover, a court could decide to adopt only the rule of section 9-103(e)(3) that applies payments
first to unsecured obligations and then to purchase-money obligations in their order of occurrence.
This would limit the court’s involvement in investigating the facts of the transaction because the only
inquiry necessary would be to the amounts of the purchase-money and nonpurchase-money
obligations and the amount of payments the debtor made.
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case.217 Section 9-103(h) invites the court to fashion a rule. It does not bar a court
from using the section 9-103 application rules. A court can use a rule that it is not
compelled to use. For example, courts use the promissory estoppel rule of section
90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts to enforce a promise regardless that the
state legislature has not adopted the Restatement.218
Other courts fashion their own payment rules. A popular application
method is “first-in, first-out,” illustrated in In re Conn.219 The court in that case
responded to the assertion that allocating payments between purchase-money and
nonpurchase-money obligations was too complicated absent a contractual or
legislative method: “We believe that one of the simplest and most direct methods of
allocating payments to secured items is the first-in, first-out method.”220 The court
then applied payments to items in the order in which the items were purchased.221
“Use of this method facilitates fairness and certainty of result . . . . It provides an
easily applied rule of thumb . . . .”222 The first-in, first-out rule is perhaps the most
easily applied of all allocation rules.223 The court need only determine the order in
which the debtor incurred the various debts and the amount of payments made.
Additionally, it might be closest to the unexpressed intent of the debtor. A debtor
would logically expect that debts would be paid in the order of their incurrence.
Also, this method has the advantage of a sense of fairness because the oldest debts
are paid first.
Recently, some courts have adopted a pro rata payment rule for a dual status
purchase-money security interest.224 These courts determine the percentages that the
217

§ 9-103 cmt. 8.

218

See School-Link Techs., Inc. v. Applied Res., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1114 (D. Kan. 2007);
Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1983); Shampton v. City of Springboro, 786 N.E.2d
883, 887 (Ohio 2003).

219

In re Conn, 16 B.R. 454, 458 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982).

220

Id.

221

Id.

222

Id. at 459.

223

The first-in, first-out method of In re Conn varies from the Article 9 adaptation of the first-in, firstout rule of U.C.C. § 9-103(e)(3) in that the type of debt is irrelevant under Conn. Subsection 9103(e)(3) applies payments first to unsecured debts, then to purchase-money obligations.
224

See, e.g., In re Busby, 393 B.R. 443, 451 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2008); In re Riach, 2008 WL 474384, at *4
(Bankr. D. Or. 2008); In re Munzberg, 388 B.R. 529, 547-48 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008); In re Conyers, 379
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purchase-money and nonpurchase-money obligations bear to the total obligation at
the time of the consolidation or future advance.225 Any payments made are applied
to the debt in proportion to those percentages.226 For example, if the purchasemoney obligation is $1500 and the nonpurchase-money obligation is $1000, the
purchase-money part of the debt is 66.67%, and the nonpurchase-money part is
33.33%. Any payments the debtor makes are applied in accordance with those
percentages. An alternate pro rata method used by some courts is to compute the
percent that each obligation bears to the total obligation at the origin of the dual
status security interest and to apply those percentages to the total debt at the time of
bankruptcy.227 For example, if the purchase-money obligation is $1600 and the
secured party makes a $400 future advance, the applicable percentages are,
respectively, 80% purchase-money and 20% nonpurchase-money. If the total debt at
the filing of bankruptcy is $1600, the purchase-money part is $1280 and the
nonpurchase-money part is $320. Pro rata application has the attributes of ease of
use and seemingly aligns with the intent of the parties.228 A debtor whose total
obligation is comprised of purchase-money and nonpurchase-money parts might
expect that any payments would be split pro rata among the debts.
Accruals of interest or penalty charges on an obligation potentially cause a
problem for allocating payments. Insofar as these charges arise from the purchasemoney obligation, they should be part of the purchase-money obligation. Official
Comment 3 to section 9-103 states that the definition of purchase-money obligation
B.R. 576, 583 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 2007); In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 162 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007), rev’d in
part, GMAC v. Horne, 390 B.R. 191, 203 (E.D. Va. 2008). These courts adopted a payment allocation
method after holding that the security interest was dual status because “negative equity” was not part
of a purchase-money obligation. See infra note 239 for a further explanation of “negative equity.”
225

See In re Riach, 2008 WL 474384, at *5 (Bankr. D. Or. 2008); In re Conyers, 379 B.R. 576, 583
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2007).
226

See In re Riach, 2008 WL 474384, at *5 (Bankr. D. Or. 2008); In re Conyers, 379 B.R. 576, 583
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2007).

227

See In re Brodowski, 391 B.R. 393, 403 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008); In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461, 468
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008).

228

Potential problems with the “pro rata” allocation of payments on a consolidated debt have arisen
as far back as 1965. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
The appeals court remanded the case to consider the unconscionability of a provision in an
installment purchase agreement that allocated payments in a manner that a balance was retained on
every item the debtor purchased until the debtor made the final payment. Id. at 450.
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includes “finance charges,” “administrative charges,” and “other similar
obligations.”229 Conversely, if such charges arise from the nonpurchase-money
obligation, they are not part of the purchase-money obligation. The parties create a
potential problem if they consolidate the purchase-money and nonpurchase-money
loans into a single obligation and interest and penalties accrue on that obligation. In
that case, however, it is possible to allocate finance charges and penalties in the same
ratio that purchase-money bears to nonpurchase-money because the court can
assume that interest and penalties accumulate proportionally.230 Several courts have
done so.231 The application formula of section 9-103(e) does not address the issue,
perhaps indicating the drafters assumed that such charges would accumulate
proportionally.232
Other payment options exist. Many jurisdictions have adopted retail
installment sales statutes that provide for a method of applying payments.233 If the
purchase-money security interest was created in such a transaction, the court can

229

As used in subsection (a)(2), the definition of “purchase-money obligation,” the
“price” of collateral or the “value given to enable” includes obligations for
expenses incurred in connection with acquiring rights in the collateral, sales taxes,
duties, finance charges, interest, freight charges, costs of storage in transit,
demurrage, administrative charges, expenses of collection and enforcement,
attorney's fees, and other similar obligations.

U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3.
230

In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Lavigne, Nos. 07-30192, 07-31402, 0731247, 06-32914, 2007 WL 3469454, at *12 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2007). The court should be
able to ascertain the ratio that each obligation bears to the total obligation at the time of refinancing
or consolidation. That calculation must be made if purchase-money and nonpurchase-money
obligations are consolidated regardless of whether interest and penalties accrue.
231

See In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Lavigne, Nos. 07-30192, 07-31402,
07-31247, 06-32914, 2007 WL 3469454, at *12 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2007).
232

The payments rule of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code applies payments first to finance
charges in the order of entry to the account and then to the payment of the debts. U.C.C.C. §
3.303(2) (1974), 7 U.L.A. 189 (2002).
233

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-8 (2011) (Georgia Retail Sales and Home Solictation Act); 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/22 (2011) (Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.861
(West 2011) (Michigan Retail Installment Sales Act); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2405 (2011) (Vermont
Retail Installment Sales Act); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.14.110 (2011) (Washington Installment Sales of
Goods and Services Act).
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apply the applicable allocation statute.234 The Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
enacted in eleven states, adopts a “first-in, first-out” application method for payment
of cross-collateral security interests.235 A cross-collateral security interest exists when
a secured party secures a new obligation with new collateral and with collateral that
secures a previous debt and also secures the previous debt with the new collateral.
Although a refinancing or future advance does not necessarily create a crosscollateral transaction, a judge nevertheless could recognize the fairness to both
parties of the U.C.C.C. allocation method and apply first-in, first-out to the case
regardless of whether the jurisdiction has enacted the U.C.C.C. The Restatement
(Second) of Contracts provides a payment rule that combines first-in, first-out with
aspects of section 9-103(e)(3). Payments are applied first to the “earliest matured
debt …, except that preference is given . . . (i) to overdue interest rather than
principle, and (ii) to an unsecured . . . debt rather than one that is secured . . . .”236
Courts frequently implement Restatement principles.237

234

Pristas v. Landaus of Plymouth, Inc., 742 F.2d 797, 801-02 (3rd Cir. 1984); In re Brouse, 6 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (CBC) 471 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1969).
235

U.C.C.C. § 3.303 (1974), 7 U.L.A. 188 (2002). Five states (Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, and
Maine) have enacted the 1974 act. 7 U.L.A. 188 (2002). The 1968 Code, U.C.C.C. § 2.409 (1968), 7
U.L.A. 387 (2002), included the identical provision. Six states (Indiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) have enacted the 1968 act without amendment. 7 U.L.A. 285 (2002).
236

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 260(2) (1981). The Restatement recognizes and
embraces the concept that the parties can agree to a payment allocation. A performance should be
applied first according to the obligor’s direction, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 258
(1981), and, if no direction, then according to the creditor’s intention, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 259 (1981). If neither direction nor intention is found, then a performance should be
applied according to section 260(2). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 260(2) (1981).
237

See, e.g., School-Link Techs., Inc. v. Applied Res., Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1114 (D. Kan 2007);
Kiely v. St. Germain, 670 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1983); Shampton v. City of Springboro, 786 N.E.2d
883, 887 (Ohio 2003).

54

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 13

A court should not be reluctant to adopt a payment method when the
parties’ agreement or other law does not provide it.238 Implementing a method is not
“making a contract” for the parties. The contract exists. Action by the court
furthers the parties’ intention in having a purchase-money security interest.
Furthermore, that action gives effect to the words “to the extent” of section 9103(b)(1). Utilizing a payment method does not require the court to untangle a mass
of transactions. Determining the amount of add-on debt incurred by a future
advance, with or without refinancing, is not a difficult burden. There are many
different ways the court can apply payments. When necessary, a court should act.
VII.

CURRENT CASES AND LEGISLATION
A. Case Law

Currently, the issue of whether to apply dual status or transformation to a
consumer goods purchase-money security interest frequently arises in cases that are
determining whether “negative equity” in a motor vehicle financing security interest
qualifies as a purchase-money obligation.239 That question became relevant as a
result of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).240 The act amended section 1325(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code by adding what is commonly called the “hanging paragraph.”241
238

See Russell A. Hakes, According Purchase Money Status Proper Priority, 72 OR. L. REV. 323, 396-97
(1993); see also Mary Aronov, The Transformation Rule Applied to Purchase Money Security Interests in
Commercial Lending Transactions, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 15, 49 (1985); Bernard A. Burk, Preserving the
Purchase Money Status of Refinanced or Commingled Purchase Money Debt, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1162-64
(1983); Ann E. Conaway Stilson, The “Overloaded” PMSI in Bankruptcy: A Problem in Search of a Resolution,
60 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 36 (1987). But see Dienna Ching, Does Negative Equity Negate the Hanging Paragraph?, 16
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 496-97 (2008).
239

See, e.g., In re White, 417 B.R. 102 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2009). Negative equity is a situation frequently
encountered in motor vehicle financing. The buyer wishes to trade an existing vehicle toward the
purchase of a new vehicle. The value of the vehicle is less than the amount the debtor owes on it, i.e.,
negative equity. The seller of the new vehicle is willing to advance the purchase price of the new
vehicle as well as funds to pay off the existing loan. The seller then takes a security interest in the new
vehicle to secure the total obligation.

240

Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat.

23.
241

The provision is called the “hanging paragraph” because it was added at the end of 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a) without a paragraph number.
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The hanging paragraph applies to purchase-money security interests that satisfy
timing and collateral requirements established in section 1325(a).242 It precludes the
debtor’s “cram down” of a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.243 Consequently, the
background for many dual status and transformation cases has shifted from
Bankruptcy Code section 522(f) to section 1325(a), although section 522(f) continues
to allow avoidance only if the security interest is in nonpurchase-money.244
Although the issue is arising in bankruptcy courts, those courts continue to
apply the Article 9 definition of purchase-money security interest because the
Bankruptcy Code does not define purchase-money security interest.245 Courts use
the Article 9 definition despite the statement in Official Comment 8 to section 9-103
that Article 9 “does not, and could not, determine a question of federal law” without
authorization from federal law.246 That comment was added to clarify that the
drafters took “no position on the meaning of ‘nonpurchase-money security interest’
for purposes of lien avoidance under Bankruptcy Code § 522(f).”247 Nevertheless,
many bankruptcy courts begin their inquiry with the Article 9 definition of purchasemoney security interest. In re Peaslee is illustrative.248

242

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9) (2010).

243

“Cram down” refers to the right of a debtor to obtain confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan that pays
the holder of a secured claim the amount of the allowed secured claim rather than the amount of the
total claim. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2010).

244

See Ching, supra note 238, at 496-97.

245

See, e.g., In re Westfall, 599 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2010); In re Howard, 597 F.3d 852, 855 (7th Cir.
2010); In re Dale, 582 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d 740, 742 (8th Cir.
2009); In re Ford, 574 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 2009); In re Price, 562 F.3d 618, 624 (4th Cir. 2009);
In re Peaslee, 547 F.3d 177, 184 n.13 (2d Cir. 2008). But see In re Westfall, 376 B.R. 210, 218-19 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 2007), rev’d, In re Westfall, 599 F.3d 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2010); Juliet M. Moringiello, A Tale
of Two Codes: Examining § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, § 9-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Proper Role of State Law in Bankruptcy, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 863, 865-80 (2001).
246

“[W]hether a security interest is a ‘purchase-money security interest’ under other law is determined
by that law. For example, decisions under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f) have applied both the dualstatus and the transformation rules. The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly adopt the state law
definition of ‘purchase-money security interest.’ Where federal law does not defer to this Article, this
Article does not, and could not, determine a question of federal law.” U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 8.
247

PEB REPORT, supra note 26, at 99 n.6.

248

In re Peaslee, 547 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Congress, presumably aware that its prior use of this term of art had
led courts to resort to state law and that state law responded with
Comment 8, once again used this term of art without providing a
federal definition or any interpretive guidance. Thus, notwithstanding
Comment 8, we believe Congress, in accordance with “the settled
principle that creditors' entitlements in bankruptcy arise in the first
instance from the underlying substantive law creating the debtor's
obligation, subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code,” meant to incorporate state law to define the term
“purchase money security interest” in the BAPCPA.249
These courts are adopting dual status if they decide that negative equity is not
part of a purchase-money obligation.250 In negative equity cases, purchase-money
and nonpurchase-money obligations are created in the same transaction when the
lender advances funds to purchase the new collateral—purchase-money—and also
advances funds to pay off the balance owed on the trade-in vehicle—nonpurchasemoney and negative equity. The new vehicle is the collateral that secures both
obligations. The issue is whether the purchase-money security interest is dual status
or is transformed into a nonpurchase-money security interest because of the
nonpurchase-money obligation. Courts adopting dual status are finding support for
their decision from the Article 9 definition of purchase-money security interest in
section 9-103, although mindful that the section 9-103 dual status rule does not apply
to a consumer goods purchase-money security interest.251 For example, in In re
Munzberg, the bankruptcy judge noted that the “to the extent” language of section 9103(b) allows collateral to secure a nonpurchase-money obligation without losing
purchase-money status.252 Similarly, the bankruptcy judge in In re McCauley stated

249

Id. at 185 n.13 (citation omitted).

250

See, e.g., In re Munzberg, 388 B.R. 529, 546 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008); In re Busby, 393 B.R. 443, 452
(Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2008); In re Acaya, 369 B.R. 564, 570 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007).
251

See, e.g., In re Mancini, 390 B.R. 796, 806-08 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); In re Acaya, 369 B.R. 564, 57071 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Lavigne, Nos. 07-30192, 07-31402, 07-31247, 06-32914, 2007 WL
3469454 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, GMAC v. Horne, 390 B.R. 191 (E.D. Va. 2008)
(holding negative equity is a purchase-money obligation); In re McCauley, 398 B.R. 41, 47 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 2008), declined to follow by, In re Ford 574 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding the entire debt to be
a purchase-money obligation).
252

Munzberg, 388 B.R. at 546.
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that “to the extent” in the UCC definition “seems to contemplate a ‘dual status’
rule.”253
The courts that adopt the transformation rule have done so on various
grounds. The judge in In re Huddle relied on pre-Revised Article 9 precedent: “The
Fourth Circuit decision . . . remains good law in the consumer-goods context and
compels a determination that the purchase-money character of 1st Advantage's
security interest was lost when the original loan was refinanced and a portion of the
proceeds used to bring a separate loan current.”254 Other courts justify adopting the
transformation rule because of the difficulty of determining what part of the security
interest is purchase-money and what part is nonpurchase-money.255 In In re Price, the
judge remarked that the task of computing what part is purchase-money, along with
allocating the payments, would be “virtually impossible.”256 The court in In re
Blakeslee declined “the task of ‘unwind[ing] the manipulations’ which would be
foisted upon it were it to apply the dual status rule to the financing of negative equity
in retail installment contracts.”257
A few courts are willing to adopt the dual status rule only if the agreement of
the parties provides a method for determining the purchase-money and
nonpurchase-money parts. In In re Tuck, the court found that the security interest
lost its purchase-money status because the contract failed to provide a method of
allocating payments between the purchase-money part and the negative equity.258
253

McCauley, 398 B.R. at 47.

254

In re Huddle, 2007 WL 2332390, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (citing Dominion Bank of
Cumberlands, NA v. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d 408 (4th Cir. 1985)). The precedential value of Nuckolls can
be questioned because the facts stated in the opinion show that the original purchase-money loan was
unsecured. The security interest was created when the purchase-money loan was refinanced and at
that time the goods purchased previously were used as collateral for the obligation. Nuckolls, 780 F.2d
at 410.
255

In re Peaslee, 358 B.R. 545 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, In re Peaslee, 585 F.3d 53
(2d Cir. 2009) (holding negative equity is purchase-money).

256

In re Price, 363 B.R. 734, 745-46 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007) citing Peaslee 358 B.R. at 558-59, rev’d, In
re Wells Fargo Fin. N.C. 1, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-133-BR, 2007 WL 5297071 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007).
The district court judge adopted the dual status rule on the ground that it furthered better the intent
of the hanging paragraph of Bankruptcy Code § 1325(a). The Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court on the ground that negative equity is purchase-money. In re Price, 562 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 2009).
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In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724, 730 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007).
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In re Tuck, No. 06-10886-DHW, 2007 WL 4365456 at *4 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2007).
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The judge in In re Bray rejected purchase-money status for the debt because “the loan
documents do not provide a method for (1) apportioning the amount of the debt
between the purchase money and nonpurchase money portions or (2) allocating the
payments to the different portions of the loan.”259
B. Legislation

Eleven states address the dual status and transformation issue with
legislation. Nine states have followed the early drafts of Revised Article 9 and
enacted a section 9-103 that applies the dual status, allocation and burden of proof
rules to all purchase-money security interests. Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota all delete the
limiting words of uniform sections 9-103(e), (f), and (g) that make the rules of those
sections inapplicable to purchase-money security interests in consumer goods.260
Consequently, in those jurisdictions purchase-money status remains regardless of
future loans or refinancing and regardless of whether the agreement of the parties
provides for allocation of payments.261
Connecticut and Tennessee have modified their versions of section 9-103(e)
to include a payment rule applicable to a consumer goods purchase-money security
interest.
In a consumer-goods transaction, if the extent to which a security
interest is a purchase-money security interest depends on the
application of a payment to a particular obligation:
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In re Bray, 365 B.R. 850, 862 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2007).

260

Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1031 (West 2011); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-9-103 (2011);
Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9.1-103 (West 2011); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103 (2011);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-103 (2011); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 9-103
(West 2011); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-103 (2011); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-0903 (2011); and South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-103 (2011). All of these jurisdictions
except Louisiana have also omitted section 9-103(h) from 9-103. Louisiana retained it as
“[Reserved.].” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-103 (2011).
261

See Citifinancial Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36, 46 (D. Kan. 2007) abrogated by In re Ford,
574 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding negative equity is a purchase-money obligation); In re
Stevens, 368 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2007); Christopher Harry, To Be (Transformed), or Not To Be: The
Transformation Versus Dual-Status Rules for Purchase-Money Security Interests Under Kansas’ Former and Revised
Article 9, 50 KAN. L. REV. 1095, 1122-24 (2002).
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(A) The payment must be applied so that the secured party retains no
purchase money security interest in any property as to which the
secured party has recovered payments aggregating the amount of the
sale price including any finance charges attributable thereto; and
(B) For the purposes of this subsection only, in the case of items
purchased on different dates, the first item purchased shall be
deemed the first paid for and, in the case of items purchased on the
same date, the lowest priced item shall be deemed first paid for.262
Yet, both states inexplicably retain the other limiting provisions of section 9-103.263
As a result, the dual status rule of section 9-103(f) continues to apply only to
purchase-money security interests other than consumer goods purchase-money
security interests.264 Consequently, courts of those jurisdictions must still decide
whether to apply dual status or transformation. A reasonable implication from
adopting the payment rule is that dual status is preferred. A Tennessee bankruptcy
court judge, considering whether to apply dual status, declared “what relevance
would allocation [the allocation provision of Tennessee’s section 9-103] have if a
purchase money security interest was transformed when collateral also secures
nonpurchase money debt?”265
It is doubtful that the UCC drafters will amend the consumer goods
purchase-money security interest limitations of section 9-103. The limitations were
the result of a compromise, making it unlikely that the issue will be revisited.
Although amendments to Article 9 have been approved recently by ALI and
NCCUSL, the amendments make no change to section 9-103. 266 Other states could
amend section 9-103 to apply its dual status and payment rules to consumer goods
262

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-103a(e)(2) (2011); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-103(e)(2) (2011).
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CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-103a (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-103 (2011).
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CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-103a (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-103 (2011).
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In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655, 674 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007) (citing In re Nolen, 53 B.R. 235, 237
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985)). But cf. In re Bray, 365 B.R. 850, 860 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2007) (declining
to adopt the dual status rule, notwithstanding the Tennessee statute, unless the parties’ agreement
provides a method for determining the extent of the purchase-money and nonpurchase-money parts
of the security interest and a method for applying payments).
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AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 (NCCUSL, Jul. 9 - Jul. 16, 2010),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucc9/2010am_approved.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2011).
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purchase-money security interests. However, the impetus for legislative change may
be difficult to find.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Whether a future advance or refinancing of a consumer goods purchasemoney security interest terminates the purchase-money status of the security interest
has been in doubt since the enactment of Article 9. The definitions of purchasemoney security interest in previous official texts of Article 9 never expressly
answered the question. The attempt of the drafters of Revised Article 9 to
definitively resolve the issue was derailed by the “consumer compromise.” In most
jurisdictions, the issue is now left to the courts.
Nevertheless, the definition of purchase-money security interest in Article 9
has always included the key to deciding the issue: “to the extent.” A security interest
is purchase-money “to the extent” the goods secure the indebtedness that enables
the debtor to purchase the goods. That phrase indicates that a security interest can
be purchase-money to the extent the goods secure the enabling debt and
nonpurchase-money to the extent they do not. It clearly contemplates a dual status
rule. A future advance, refinancing, or consolidation should not transform the
underlying nature of the purchase-money obligation unless the parties intend to
terminate the purchase-money debt. Courts should give effect to the words of
section 9-103 and apply the dual status rule.
Adopting the dual status rule does make the task of the court more difficult
if the debtor makes a payment on an obligation that is part purchase-money and part
nonpurchase-money. Unless the parties’ agreement indicates how to allocate the
debt between the two parts, a court must decide on an appropriate application. That
involves determining the amount of each part of the security interest and deciding if
or how to divide the payment between the parts. It is an insurmountable barrier for
some courts. Others take on the task.
Application of payments is neither impossible nor overwhelming. First-in,
first-out—where the oldest debt is paid first—is perhaps the easiest for a court to
apply. A court need only determine the oldest debt. Pro rata—where the payment is
applied proportionately to the percentage each part bears to the whole—is not
difficult to apply. A court need only determine the appropriate ratios. And not to be
overlooked is the payment rule of section 9-103(e). A court seeking an application
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method could apply the section on a case-by-case basis as needed to implement the
dual status rule.
There are compelling reasons why dual status should be the appropriate rule
for consumer goods purchase-money security interests. Dual status fits the Article 9
definition of purchase-money security interest.
Additionally, there is no
unanticipated adverse effect on the debtor or other creditors if the security interest is
part purchase-money and part nonpurchase-money. Applying the rule does not
place a heavy burden on the court. Finally, the parties intended for the secured
party to have a purchase-money security interest, and a court should respect that
intent.

